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THOSE ORIGINAL SIX OWNERS

September 12th, 2009 · No Comments

by Ron Spence

Hockey News writer Adam Proteau was taking the NHL owners to task over the NHLPA’s firing of Paul Kelly.

He referred to “…a Goodenowian philosophy from the owners….”

Mr. Proteau is obviously chronologically challenged.

That’s like saying that Roberto Luongo taught Georges Vezina how to play in goal.

Bob Goodenow was mirroring Alan Eagleson who totally mirrored the old Original Six owners.

Those power brokers made Charles Dickens’ villains seem like Mother Theresa.

The Original Six owners controlled their players through C-forms, which their chattels had to sign in order to turn professional.

This dictated where players played and for how much.

Phil Esposito, later a Boston superstar and Tampa Bay GM, was told in the early ‘60s:


“Chicago’s offering you $500 to sign and $3250 for the season. You’d better take it. That’s all Tommy Ivan says you’ll get. If you don’t sign, you won’t play anywhere.”

Gordie Howe said:

“I was sort of a pushover. I used to come into Jack Adams’ office and say, ‘If I’m supposed to be the best player in the league, you can pay me accordingly.’

He’d say he would, and that would be the end of it.

Of course he never did.

Later I found out there were three guys in the organization itself that were making more money than I was.

The only time I ever brought anyone in to help me, it was Ted Lindsay. We were going to negotiate together, but Adams negotiated with us with two words: ‘Get out.’”

Not only were the NHL players poorly paid – they had few options. If they didn’t make their NHL team, they could only hope to be traded. Otherwise, they were buried in the minors.

Former Leaf, Brian Conacher wrote of hockey at this time:


“The name of the game was to keep control of as many players as you could.  Obviously, you couldn’t hurt the Leafs if you were playing for one of their minor pro teams.”

One of the few avenues of escape was waivers.

But, the owners also manipulated that process.

This was evident in February, 1967. Detroit had asked to send 20-year-old Peter Mahovlich to their farm team, without applying for waivers. Then, New York blocked Detroit and the Red Wings in turn blocked the Leafs’ attempt to “farm” John Brenneman.

The result was: two players were sitting in the press box with their meters running. So, the owners quickly agreed to an amendment. The player had to stay in the minors – for the rest of the season.

One reason for the owners’ unity came from the power and control of Big Jim Norris. He owned the Detroit Red Wings, the Chicago Stadium, and controlling interest in Madison Square Gardens. He also loaned money to Boston – when they were in financial trouble – and thus had control over them.

The only two teams that Norris didn’t control were the Leafs and Habs.

The owners started to lose their power some forty years ago.

And ironically, they were the masters of their own decline.

Prior to the 1967-68 season, the NHL expanded from six to twelve teams and the new American franchises had little access to the predominately Canadian talent pool. So, the NHL had to introduce the universal draft. The result was that NHL teams could no longer control players – from their teenage years until their retirement – through C-forms.

The new franchises south of the border also realized that they had to put a face to their game, and had to promote hockey by using their stars.

This in turn gave players some power, and control.

Then three things happened which really shifted the power: Salaries in other sports started to skyrocket; there were people called “agents” who appeared out of nowhere; and a rival league announced itself.

The World Hockey Association – like the KHL today, offered higher salaries, greater perks, and a second option.

The result? Owners had to raise salaries to keep their players from moving to the rival circuit.

The New York Rangers, for example, gave Vic Hadfield an unprecedented five-year $1 million deal, even though he had two years remaining on his lower paying contract.

In addition, with more money in their pockets, players could now afford to hold out – withdraw their services – and outwait their bosses.

Ironically, the new players’ association was of little use while all of this was happening.

David Cruise and Alison Griffiths wrote in Net Worth:


“Any concession wrung from the NHL owners, was cause to celebrate, but, in light of the players’ real leverage, the advances were pathetic. The much-touted increased minimum wage must have had the owners snorting into their whiskies.”

The NHLPA’s first powerbroker, Alan Eagleson had learned some of the owners’ tactics before he was replaced. His successor had a similar philosophy towards control, but couldn’t hold a candle to those Original Six martinets.

Tags: HISTORY

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